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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,' advocates are strongly urging the extension of
rule of reason analysis to non-vertical intrabrand territorial allocation
schemes.' The principal argument made by opponents of the per se rule is
t B.A. 1953, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1959 Northwestern University. Dean and Professor
of Law, Drake University Law School.
tt B.B.A. 1970, George Washington University; J.D. 1975, Indiana University. Associate
Professor of Law, Drake University Law School.
1. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
2. See, e.g., Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the
Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Reflections on the Sylvania
Decision]; Weisberg, Continental T.V. GTE Sylvania: Implications for Horizontal As Well As
Vertical Restraints on Distributors, 33 Bus. L. 757 (1978); Comment, A Proposed Rule of Rea-
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that the solitary goal of the antitrust laws is economic efficiency and that a
strict application of the per se rule to intrabrand allocations, vertical or hor-
izontal, should give way where the net effect of such allocations will not
hamper interbrand competition.' Therefore, because Sylvania has elimi-
nated the per se rule with respect to vertical intrabrand allocations, the ar-
gument is that for the same reasons the per se rule should be removed for
horizontal allocations.
4
The purpose of this Article is to consider the continued importance of
the per se rule of liability under section one of the Sherman Act in the con-
text of intrabrand allocations. The first section of this Article will analyze
the ruling in Sylvania. The second section will consider four levels of in-
trabrand allocation: (1) the horizontal allocation at the manufacturer level;
(2) the horizontal allocation at the distributor level; (3) the dual distribution
allocation and (4) the vertical allocation. Significant recent decisions will be
reviewed to identify judicial efforts at characterizing these restraints. The
final section will critically examine the prospect of abrogation of the per se
rule in these intrabrand allocation schemes within the context of antitrust
goals and policy.
II. SYLVANIA AND THE RULE OF REASON
Prompted by declines in its national market share, GTE Sylvania, Inc.
(Sylvania), a manufacturer of television sets, revamped its distribution sys-
tem. Previously, it had sold its televisions to independent or company-
owned distributors for resale to retailers. The new distribution system,
adopted in 1962, did not rely on wholesale distributors, but rather involved
direct sales to a small group of franchised dealers. Sylvania hoped that this
selective distribution policy would increase the franchise retailers' incentive
to move Sylvania products.' To provide further incentive, Sylvania limited
the number of franchise retailers in particular sales areas, although it did
not grant its retailers exclusive sales territories, and imposed a restriction
that required franchisees to sell Sylvania products only from the location or
son Analysis for Restrictions on Distribution, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 527 (1979); Note, Antitrust
Treatment of Intrabrand Territorial Restraints within a Dual Distribution System, 56 TEx. L.
Rxv. 1486 (1978).
3. See Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, supra note 2, at 6-12.
4. Id.
5. The opinion by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental
T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 982-83 (9th Cir. 1976), sets forth the change in company policy. Sylva-
nia had used a "saturation" method of distribution whereby television sets were sold to many
distributors and dealers without any limit upon the number of retail sellers in any given area.
The revamped policy called an "elbow room" policy, involved selection of only a few retail
sellers in any given market. The purpose of such a selective policy was to attract more aggres-
sive and effective dealers who would be identified as authorized Sylvania dealers. This identifi-
cation of dealers was intended to establish a prestige image for the dealers and the products.
[Vol. 30
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locations specified in the franchise agreement.6 Sylvania, however, did not
impose any restrictions on its franchisees concerning their right to sell prod-
ucts of competing manufacturers.
Continental T.V., Inc. (Continental), a prosperous franchisee, at-
tempted to establish a new retail location in a different territory.' Sylvania
refused to approve Continental's new retail location, and, ultimately, Sylva-
nia terminated Continental's franchise.8 Subsequently, a finance company,
which handled Sylvania's credit arrangements with franchisees, sued Conti-
nental, which then cross-claimed against Sylvania and the finance company
claiming that the restrictive location agreement violated section one of the
Sherman Act. The district court rejected Sylvania's assertion that the loca-
tion clause was illegal only if it was shown to be unreasonable, and in-
structed the jury that the clause was illegal per se if the jury concluded that
Sylvania "exercised dominion or control over the products. . after having
parted with title and risk to the products." The jury answered in the af-
firmitive and assessed Continental's damages at $591,505, which was trebled.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, en banc, reversed the district court in a
sharply divided decision.10 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the location
clause had pro-competitive effects and therefore the rule of reason, rather
than the per se rule, was the appropriate standard."
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit. 2 First, the Court noted
that the case presented essentially the same issue as United States v. Ar-
nold, Schwinn & Co.," in which the Court declared a vertically-imposed lo-
cation clause restriction illegal per se.1 4 The Sylvania Court considered the
6. 433 U.S. at 38. Sylvania, in its franchise agreements, retained sole discretion to in-
crease the number of authorized dealers in any given territory. Id.
7. Continental's attempt to establish a new retail location in Sacramento, California,
which was outside its franchise location in San Francisco, was actuated in part by Sylvania's
prior grant of another franchise to Young Brothers in San Francisco. Despite Continental's
complaint to Sylvania that the Young Brothers' franchise violated Continental's franchise
agreement with Sylvania, Sylvania approved the Young Brothers' franchise. Id. at 39.
8. Both opinions by the Supreme Court and the court of appeals contained a wealth of
information concerning the deterioration in the relationship between Sylvania and Continental.
Id. at 39-40; 537 F.2d at 982-85. However, the Court concluded that these factors were irrele-
vant to the antitrust issue. 433 U.S. at 39-40 & n.7.
9. Id. at 40-41.
10. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976). The major-
ity and dissenting opinions of the three-judge panel which originally heard the appeal were
withdrawn by order of the full court. These opinions are unofficially reported in [1974-1 Trade
Cases] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 75,072 (9th Cir. May 9, 1974).
11. 537 F.2d at 997.
12. 433 U.S. at 59.
13. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
14. Id. at 379. In Schwinn, the defendant imposed various territorial restrictions on dis-
tributors, franchise retailers and Schwinn agents. The Court concluded that the restrictive
clauses on customers were illegal per se where the customers were not bona fide agents or con-
signees and the manufacturer did not retain title, dominion and risk of loss with respect to the
Antitrust1980-81]
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customer restriction in that case to be analytically similar to the location
clause in Schwinn,1 5 and proceeded to reconsider its decision in Schwinn.
The per se rule of illegality, the Sylvania Court stated, is the exception from
the more generally applicable rule of reason, and indeed, per se rules "are
appropriate only when they relate to conduct that is manifestly
anticompetitive."16
The Sylvania Court, expressing great doubt as to the analytic founda-
tion of the per se rule announced in Schwinn, engaged in a comparative
analysis of interbrand competition and intrabrand competition in the con-
text of vertical non-price restraints. Vertical restrictions, the Court noted,
reduce intrabrand competition, but they also "promote interbrand competi-
tion by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the dis-
tribution of his products. 1 7 More specifically, the Court identified several
economic considerations concerning a manufacturer's desire to control cer-
tain distribution policies affecting its product.8 Interestingly, the Court's
goods. "It is," the Court held "unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to restrict and
confine areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted
with dominion over it." Id.
15. 433 U.S. at 46 & n.12.
16. Id. at 50.
The Court quoted from the case of Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958), that "there are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use." 433 U.S. at 50.
The Court then explained in a footnote its conception of the per se rule:
Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the so-
cial utility of particular commercial practices. The probability that anticompetitive
consequences will result from a practice and the severity of those consequences must
be balanced'against its procompetitive consequences. Cases that do not fit the gener-
alization may arise, but a per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not
sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to iden-
tify them. Once established, per se rules tend to provide guidance to the business
community and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial system of the
more complex rule-of-reason trials, see Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, at 5 (1958); United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-610
(1972), but those advantages are not sufficient in themselves to justify the creation of
per se rules. If it were otherwise, all of antitrust law would be reduced to per se rules,
thus introducing an unintended and undesirable rigidity in the law.
433 U.S. at 50 n.16 (citations omitted).
17. Id. at 54.
18. The Court explained that vertical restrictions reduce "intrabrand competition by lim-
iting the number of sellers of a particular product competing for the business of a given group
of buyers." Id. However, the Court continued, vertical restrictions permit the manufacturers to
achieve "certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products," and thereby stimulate inter-
brand competiton. Id.
In support of its conclusion regarding the efficacy of vertical non-price restrictions, the
Court noted two methods by which manufacturers could improve their competitive posture.
First, manufacturers can use territorial restrictions to induce more aggressive retailing by their
[Vol. 30
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sources of authority for its rather unprecedented economic efficiency analy-
sis were several law review articles by academic lawyers and economists ad-
vocating the use of efficiency criteria in formulating per se rules.'9
Finally, the Court expressly overruled Schwinn, characterizing it as an
aberration from the per se standard articulated in Northern Pacific.'0 In
requiring use of the rule of reason in cases involving vertical non-price re-
strictions, the Court noted that these "restrictions, in varying forms, are
widely used in our free market economy. [T]here is substantial scholarly and
judicial authority supporting their economic utility. There is relatively little
authority to the contrary."'" To this statement, the Court appended a pro-
vocative footnote:
There may be occasional problems in differentiating vertical restric-
tions from horizontal restrictions originating in agreements among the
retailers. There is no doubt that restrictions in the latter category would
be illegal per se, see, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384
U.S. 127 (1966); United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., supra, but we do
not regard the problems of proof as sufficiently great to justify a per se
rule.2 '
The Court's footnote concerning horizontal arrangements and the ac-
companying text, are provocative both for what the Court stated and for
what the Court left unanswered. First, the Court suggested that the factual
issue of characterization of alleged offenses as "vertical" or "horizontal" may
be determinative. Secondly, the Court implied that economic efficiency cri-
teria are the benchmark by which all "vertical" restraints will be analyzed.
In concluding, the Court stated that "we do make clear that departure from
the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic ef-
fect rather than-as in Schwinn-upon formalistic line drawing.""s Finally,
the Sylvania opinion did not provide an analytic framework with which to
customers and to instill greater brand loyalty where customers marketed several brands. These
goals, the Court noted, required manufacturers to limit, through restrictive territorial schemes,
the tendency of some retailers to take a "free ride" on the promotional or service activities of
their intrabrand dealers. Id. at 55. Secondly, the Court pointed to literature that argued that
manufacturers have "an economic interest in maintaining as much intrabrand competition as is
consistent with the effective distribution of their products," and that this manufacturer self-
interest will advance the social and economic welfare of consumers, advance opportunities for
small businessmen by reducing tendencies toward vertical integration and provide better mar-
ket information. Id. at 56-57 & nn.24-26.
19. See, e.g., Bork, The Rule of Reason and Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Deci-
sions, 75 COLUM. L. Rv. 282 (1975); Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Eco-
nomic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 506 (1965).
20. 433 U.S. at 57-58.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 58 n.28 (citations omitted).
23. Id. at 58-59.
1980-81]
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approach the problem of characterizing vertical and horizontal restraints
and the problem of selecting the proper economic theory for analysis.
24
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Sylvania decision is the ab-
sence of any meaningful recognition of any goals of antitrust policy other
than economic efficiency. However, given the diversity of antitrust goals and
the lack of any cohesive theory of distributional efficiency it is questionable
whether Sylvania will have any permanent impact on the use of per se
analysis in non-vertical intrabrand restriction cases.
III. INTRABRAND ALLOCATION SCHEMES
In the aftermath of Sylvania, and its rejection of the per se rule in ver-
tical territorial allocation situations, speculation has mounted as to the fu-
ture erosion of the per se rule in other intrabrand allocation situations.
More particularly, the inquiry is whether the Court will look solely to eco-
nomic theories to support or condemn other non-price territorial restraints
or whether non-economic policies of the antitrust laws will be factored into
the decision.
This section of the Article examines several cases involving certain in-
trabrand distribution schemes. The cases, which were decided both before
and after the Sylvania case, are used to develop the economic and non-eco-
nomic policy perspectives which form the basis of a cogent theory of in-
trabrand restraints.
A. Allocation Schemes Defined
Before discussing each of the four areas, it is essential that they be
properly identified. A vertical allocation is perhaps easiest to identify for it
exists when a single manufacturer sells a product (e.g., Sylvania television
sets) to its distributors and in doing so grants to each an exclusive territory
in which to sell that product. The allocation occurs at the distributor level
and eliminates intrabrand competition between distributors. The impetus
for the vertical allocation comes from the manufacturer and not from the
distributors, although the latter may individually request from the manufac-
turer territorial protection as a condition to handling the product.
A horizontal allocation at the manufacturers' level occurs when one
manufacturer licenses another manufacturer, which is a competitor or po-
24. Recent literature reflects the lack of a cogent formulation of the rule of reason analy-
sis in vertical cases. See Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, supra note 2; Strasser, Vertical
Territorial Restraints After Sylvania: A Policy Analysis and Proposed New Rule, 1977 DuKE
L.J. 775; Zelek, Stern & Dunfee, A Rule of Reason Decision Model After Sylvania, 68 CALIF. L.
REv. 13 (1980).
For the most part these writings proffer economic models and analysis to be applied in
cases of vertical non-price restraints. These models are helpful insofar as they provide a frame-
work for evaluation of economic factors in a rule of reason analysis but they are deficient in
that they limit the range of policy factors to economic efficiency criteria. See Part IV infra.
[Vol. 30
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tential competitor, to manufacture and sell a particular trademarked prod-
uct and in so doing grants an exclusive territory in which the latter can
manufacture and sell. The licensing manufacturer also retains for itself an
exclusive territory."5
Similarly, a horizontal allocation at the distributor level occurs when
distributors agree among themselves to divide up the distributor market in a
particular product thereby giving to each an exclusive area. The manufac-
turer selling the product vertically to the distributors may or may not af-
firmatively acquiesce in the allocation.
A dual distributor allocation occurs when a single manufacturer sells a
product to several distributors and assigns each an exclusive territory, and,
in addition, retains for itself an exclusive territory in which it acts as its own
distributor competing against the independent distributors. The system is
dual because the manufacturer is both selling to distributors as well as to
retailers in competition with its distributors.
B. Horizontal Allocation at the Manufacturer Level
The primary source of intrabrand territorial allocations is the trade-
mark license. When one manufacturer licenses another to manufacture a
trademarked product, grants an exclusive territory in which to manufacture
and sell, and reserves to itself another area for exclusive manufacturing and
sale, a horizontal allocation of the market occurs. The principal question is
whether this trademark allocation should continue to be tested against the
per se rule rather than the rule of reason.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that purely
horizontally imposed territorial restraints are illegal per se because of the
variety of pernicious effects. The leading decision is Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States,26 in which the Court considered a purely horizontal
restraint. In that case the defendant, an Ohio corporation manufacturing
tapered roller bearings, granted to British Timken an exclusive license to
manufacture Timken roller bearings in certain areas of the world including
Great Britain and Continental Europe with the remainder of the world be-
ing reserved to the defendant. The defendant and British Timken then li-
censed French Timken to operate in an exclusive territory covering France
and its territories. Defendant argued that the restraints agreed upon, which
included the territorial allocations, price fixing, cooperating to protect each
other's markets and to eliminate outside competition, and participating in
cartels to restrict imports to and exports from the United States, were rea-
25. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); American Mo-
tor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3rd Cir. 1975); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice
Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
26. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
1980-81]
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sonable steps taken to implement a valid trademark licensing system.2"
The Court forcefully rejected the defendant's contention and held that
a trademark cannot be "used as a device for a Sherman Act violation."28
The Court's opinion indicated a substantial concern that the primary pur-
pose and effect of the price and territorial restraints was continuance of a
horizontal cartel. However, the Timken Court did not distinguish between
an intrabrand allocation of the market and an interbrand allocation of the
market, although interbrand market allocation schemes had been declared
illegal under section one of the Sherman Act. 9 A question therefore arose
after the Timken decision as to whether an intrabrand allocation alone was
sufficient to invoke the per se rule of section one of the Sherman Act. The
answer to the question became apparent ten years after Timken when an
abortive attempt was made to amend the Lanham Act s so that a trademark
owner could grant exclusive territories to its licensees thereby creating a le-
gal intrabrand allocation.
To fully understand this attempt to amend the Lanham Act8" and to
eliminate the per se rule as to horizontal intrabrand allocations, considera-
tion must be given to the legislative history of the Act itself. As originally
proposed, the Lanham Act was strongly opposed by the Department of Jus-
tice on the ground that it would become a vehicle for antitrust violations.8 2
27. Id. at 596, 598. One of the primary holdings of Timken was that a conspiracy can exist
between corporations with a common ownership. The Supreme Court stated that the "fact that
there is common ownership or control of the contracting corporations does not liberate them
from the impact of the antitrust laws." Id. at 598. This proposition has been uniformily fol-
lowed in cases involving parent and subsidiary corporations. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S.
110, 116 (1948); 'United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947); Columbia Meat
Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 33 & n.49 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 876 (1978); Martin B. Glauser Dodge v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 79, 81 n.16 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Mutual Fund Investors, Inc. v. Putman Management
Co., 553 F.2d 620, 625 (9th Cir. 1977). See also Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Sec-
tion One of the Sherman Act: A Suggested Standard, 75 MICH. L. REv. 717 (1977).
28. 341 U.S. at 599. The Supreme Court's analysis underscored the rationale of the lower
court's opinion. That court stated:
If a trade-mark may be the legal basis for allocating world markets, fixing of prices,
restricting competition, the unfailing device has been found to destroy every vestige
of inhibition set up by the Sherman Act. The rights pertaining to trade-marks and
trade names were well known long before that legislative enactment was passed by
Congress. It is certain that it was never intended that the consequences of violations
of the antitrust laws may be escaped by the licensing of trade-marks.
United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
29. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175
U.S. 211 (1899); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332
U.S. 319 (1947).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976).
31. Id.
32. See Hearings on H.R. 82 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copy-
[Vol. 30
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In its report to the Subcommittee on Patents, the Department of Justice
noted that trademarks had been used "in recent years as a convenient vehi-
cle for" (1) geographical allocations, (2) customer allocations, (3) discrimina-
tion between different channels of distribution, (4) maintenance of goodwill
of competitor companies and (5) monopolistic control through use of trade-
marks. 33 As a positive response to the Department of Justice's objections,
Congress enacted an amendment, the intent of which was to preserve the
applicability of the antitrust laws to trademark licensing. Section 33(b)(7) of
the Lanham Act provides, as a defense to the trademark infringement,
"[tihat the mark has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of
the United States."'"
Statements in the debates on the Lanham Act appear to indicate that
section 33(b)(7) was intended to preserve all the force and effect of the anti-
trust laws to trademark or intrabrand licensing. The intent of making an
antitrust violation a defense to a trademark infringement was to foreclose
the use of trademark licensing as a vehicle to foster restraints of trade, par-
ticularily collusive or cartel activity among competitors.8 5
rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 58-71 (1944) (report of the
Department of Justice).
33. Cf. Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. J.A. Buchroeder & Co., 251 F. Supp. 968, 978 (W.D.
Mo. 1966) (legislative history of the Lanham Act). The Department of Justice in the same
report stated:
The privileges conferred upon copyright and patent are rewards for contributions to
knowledge and technology which ultimately become a part of the public domain
available to all. The privileges conferred on the inventor and author are limited in
time, in scope, and in restrictive practices which may be adopted in commercial ex-
ploitation. Sanctions for these privileges are found in the Constitution. Trade-marks
have no such sanction. In our economic system, dependent on free competition for its
growth and expansion, it would be anomalous to accord to the trade-mark privileges
not enjoyed by higher forms of creative effort. (4 Toulmin's Anti-Trust Laws, foot-
note 53, pp. 794-795).
251 F. Supp. at 978.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7) (1976).
35. Senator O'Mahoney, in explaining the effect of the antitrust defense, stated that
"[T]he point I wish to make perfectly clear is that the use of such mark to violate the antitrust
laws, constitutes a defense in an infringement suit." 92 CONG. R.c. 7873 (1946). He stated that:
It is of such great importance to the public of the United States that reAtraints of
trade shall not be permitted, that the Senate inserted this amendment to make it a
ground of contestability if it should be shown that the registrant was using the mark
itself to violate the antitrust law.
Id. (emphasis added).
Senator O'Mahoney further stated:
It appeared, however, from the history of litigation in the United States, that trade-
marks from time to time-not at all as a general practice, I want it understood, but
only from time to time-have been used in the violation of the antitrust laws. It was
also felt that under the language of the bill trade names could be used to prolong a
patent monopoly after expiration of a patent. One of the Senate amendments, agreed
to with slight modifications by the House, was intended to eliminate this possibility. I
1980-81]
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Although the legislative history makes clear that the Lanham Act does
not immunize trademark licensors from the antitrust laws, it did not address
the critical issue of whether violations of the antitrust laws were to be mea-
sured only against the rule of reason, or whether the traditional per se viola-
tions, though arising in the trademark context, should continue to receive
per se treatment.
Ten years after the Timken decision special interest groups attempted
to have the Lanham Act amended so that all antitrust violations arising in
connection with trademark licensing would be tested against the rule of rea-
son. In 1961, a bill was introduced in the Senate to remove the per se re-
strictions in the intrabrand trademark license category of cases. The bill
provided in section 5(k): "The registrant of a mark by registered users, may,
irrespective of any affiliation or relationship between the registrant and such
registered users, prescribe conditions and restrictions as to mode and place
of permitted use by each registered user of the mark." 6
Proponents of the legislation testified that "it is imperative for the pol-
icy of the law to be established that when it is ancillary to a trademark
license, there be no restrictions on the right to grant exclusive territories. ' ' s7
The principal contention was that the amendment would eliminate the per
se rule in allocation cases and leave each case to be tested under the rule of
reason." The Department of Justice actively opposed the amendment on
the ground that it would exempt "numerous per se violations from the ap-
plicability of the antitrust laws," encourage collusive behavior and thwart
the intentions of the drafters of both the Sherman and Lanham Acts.8s
think it is effective for that purpose.
Id. at 7872.
Senator Hawkes stated: "If a trademark should be used as the legal, causal and efficient
instrumentality to effect a contract, agreement or arrangement which violates the antitrust laws
then the actual use of the mark to carry out such a scheme would constitute a use in violation
of the antitrust laws .. " Id. at 7636.
36. See Hearings on S. 1396 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copy-
rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1961) (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 74.
38. For example, counsel of Sealy, Inc., which was currently in litigation over price and
territorial restrictions accompanying a trademark license, testified that the proposed amend-
ment was necessary to indicate to the Justice Department that "not in all circumstances did
Congress believe that territorially exclusive licenses would constitute a per se violation of the
Sherman Act." Id. at 32. Senator Hart inquired as to whether the proposed amendment would
legalize all territorial allocations, to which Counsel responded:
Well, Mr. Chairman, it doesn't say such allocations are permitted. It says that such
allocations are not per se violations of the Sherman Act. In other words, you might
very well have a situation that you had in the Addyston and National Lead cases,
where the parties to the arrangement dominated their industry and where there
would be a real restraint of trade.
Id. at 33.
39. In a letter signed by Byron R. White, Deputy Attorney General, to Senator Eastland,
dated June 22, 1961, the Department of Justice stated, inter alia:
[Vol. 30
HeinOnline  -- 30 Drake L. Rev. 10 1980-1981
Antitrust
The amendment was not passed, thus giving some weight to the belief
that Congress intended that the courts strictly construe attempts by com-
petitors or potential competitiors to restrict or control trade among them-
selves. This congressional intent was manifested by the Supreme Court in
two subsequent cases.
First, in United States v. Sealy, Inc.,"° the government brought a civil
action alleging that the defendant Sealy, Inc. had conspired with its trade-
mark licensees, manufacturers of mattresses in the United States, to fix re-
tail prices and to allocate mutually exclusive territories among the manufac-
turer-licensees. The trial court found that there was price fixing, but, as to
the territorial allocation, the lower court found that the conduct proven was
not an unreasonable restraint of trade, and the United States appealed.
The Supreme Court noted that exclusive territories were allocated to
the manufacturer-licensees, and that "Sealy agreed with each licensee not to
license any other person to manufacture or sell in the designated area; and
the licensee agreed not to manufacture or sell 'Sealy products' outside the
designated area.""1 The issue, however, was whether the allocation was hori-
zontal or vertical. Unlike Timken, Sealy, Inc. was not a manufacturer but
solely a licensing agent. Thus, the horizontal aspect of the allocation had to
be shown by the manufacturer-licensees' control of Sealy, Inc. The Court
found licensees' control based on the facts that (1) the licensees owned all
the stock of Sealy, Inc., (2) the board of directors and executive committee
were comprised solely of licensee-stockholders and (3) the affairs of Sealy,
It was never intended [sic] that the effects of antitrust violations may be escaped
by the licensing of trademarks. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Company, 83
F. Supp. 254, 314-316 (N.D. Ohio, 1949) expressly affirmed in this respect, 341 U.S.
593, 598-599 (1951). The Lanham Act itself shows that violations of the antitrust laws
are not immunized by the magic touch of a trademark. Section 33(b)(7) (15 U.S.C. §
11(b)(7)) provides that the use of a trademark in violation of the antitrust laws shall
be a defense even against an incontestable trademark whose 5-year registration other-
wise constitutes conclusive evidence of the exclusive right to its user.
The provisions of the proposed new subsection (k) of Section 5 would give the
registrant well nigh absolute power to impose, with impunity, otherwise anti-
trust-tainted restrictions. The word "place" would protect every division of territo-
ries. The word "mode" would save-from antitrust illegality-tying clauses, compul-
sory joint agencies, and many other conceivable restraints. Also, the establishing of
suggested prices (which have a natural tendency to become rigidly fixed) might be
contended as a mode of use....
* * .This would be inconsistent with the declared purpose of the author of the
act "to protect honest business and also to protect the purchasers of commodities so
that they know the origin of the goods they are buying." Congressman Lanham, 91
Congressional Record 1724.
Hearings on S. 1396 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 178-79 (1961).
40. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
41. Id. at 352. The Court noted that "a manufacturer could make and sell his private
label products anywhere he might choose," contrary to the arrangement in Timken. Id.
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Inc., including the grant, assignment, reassignment and termination of ex-
clusive territorial licenses, were operated in fact by the manufacturer-
licensees.4
The Court, relying on Timken, engaged in a pragmatic and functional
analysis of the territorial arrangement, and concluded that:
The territorial arrangements must be regarded as the creature of hori-
zontal action by the licensees. It would violate reality to treat them as
equivalent to territorial limitations imposed by a manufacturer upon in-
dependent dealers as incident to the sale of trademarked products. Sealy,
Inc., is an instrumentality of the licensees for purposes of the horizontal
territorial allocation. It is not the principal.43
Defendant urged that the rule of reason be applied even though the
allocation was horizontal in nature. The Court rejected this suggestion on
the ground that the arrangements for territorial limitations were part of
"'an aggregation of trade restraints' including unlawful price-fixing and
policing."""
The second Supreme Court decision considering intrabrand territorial
allocations was United States v. Topco Associates." Defendant Topco was a
cooperative association made up of approximately twenty-five small and me-
dium sized regional supermarket chains operating stores in some thirty-
three states. The association served as a purchasing agent for its members
and distributed to them, under the Topco name, approximately 1,000 food
products which were delivered directly from the packer or manufacturer to
the individual stores. Topco granted licenses to member stores to sell Topco
brand products. With each license granted, Topco designated the territory
in which each store could sell. No member store could sell outside the terri-
tory in which it was licensed.
The government brought a civil action contending that the division of
markets among member stores "operated to prohibit competition in Topco-
brand products."' 6 Topco argued, and the district court agreed, that it
needed to grant exclusive territories to members in order to compete with
the large chain stores. Moreover, the association contended that it could not
exist if the territorial divisions were anything but exclusive and "that by
restricting competition in the sale of Topco-brand products, the association
actually increased competition by enabling its members to compete success-
fully with larger regional and national chains.' 4 7
42. Id. at 352-53.
43. Id. at 354.
44. Id. at 357. The Court noted that the fact that Timken restricted both trademarked as
well as non-trademarked products, whereas the territorial restrictions of Sealy were limited to
trademarked products, were differences in fact which were "not consequential." Id. at 356 n.3.
45. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
46. Id. at 603.
47. Id. at 605. Topco argued that the small retail store members were unable to compete
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the allocations in question
were horizontal and thus per se illegal. Relying on Sealy, the Court noted
that Topco was controlled by its licensees who owned the Topco stock and
sat on its board of directors. The Court further noted that both Topco and
Sealy "agreed with the licensees not to license other manufacturers or sellers
to sell [trademarked products] in a designated territory in exchange for the
promise of the licensee who sold in that territory not to expand its sales
beyond the area demarcated by" the licensor." The Court concluded that
such was a horizontal territorial restraint similar to the one found in Sealy.
The Topco Court addressed the difficult argument that the rule of rea-
son should apply because the territorial allocation eliminated only in-
trabrand competition, and that limiting intrabrand competition would foster
interbrand competition with the supermarket chains. The Court first stated
that courts had institutional infirmities which impaired their ability to bal-
ance anticompetitive impacts to one market sector with pro-competitive ef-
fects in another sector, and that these infirmities were a principal justifica-
tion for per se rules. 9 Moreover, the Court asserted that important
decisions as to trade-offs between intrabrand and interbrand competition
could not be entrusted to a group of competitors, and more importantly,
that the Sherman Act guaranteed fundamental freedom by competitors to
make independent decisions concerning the nature and extent of
competition."
effectively with the national and large regional chains without exclusive private label products,
and that the only way Topco could procure private label products and assure the exclusivity
thereof was through trademark licenses specifying the territory in which each member could
sell such products. Id.
48. Id. at 609.
49. The Court stated:
Whether or not we would decide this case the same way under the rule of reason used
by the District Court is irrelevant to the issue before us. The fact is that courts are of
limited utility in examining difficult economic problems. Our inability to weigh, in
any meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the economy
against promotion of competition in another sector is one important reason we have
formulated per se rules.
Id. at 609-10. Finally the Court in a footnote made it clear that horizontal territorial allocations
without the presence of price fixing as in Timken and Sealy, are in themselves per se illegal. Id.
at 609 n.9.
50. The Court stated that:
Topco has no authority under the Sherman Act to determine the respective values of
competition in various sectors of the economy. On the contrary, the Sherman Act
gives to each Topco member and to each prospective member the right to ascertain
for itself whether or not competition with other supermarket chains is more desirable
than competition in the sale of Topco-brand products. Without territorial restric-
tions, Topco members may indeed '[cut] each others throats.' Cf. White Motor Co.,
supra, at 278 (Clark, J., dissenting). But, we have never found this possibility suffi-
cient to warrant condoning horizontal restraints of trade.
405 U.S. at 610-11.
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Subsequent lower court cases have consistently applied the per se rule
to horizontal trademark license arrangements. In American Motors Inns,
Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 1 franchisees of Holiday Inns were granted the
right to construct and operate Holiday Inns at "specified sites."5 2 The de-
fendant Holiday Inns, in addition to franchising independent owners, also
owned and operated through a subsidiary approximately 281 Holiday Inns.
The impermissible allocation of territories arose, not in the franchise agree-
ment, but because the three nearest existing franchisees could object to the
proposed location of new inns. Holiday Inns carefully considered the fran-
chisees' objections in determining the location. Also, franchisees agreed not
to operate motels other than Holiday Inns. Since Holiday Inns could refuse
to grant franchises in areas in which it already operated a motel, ("company
towns") Holiday Inns was able to allocate to itself exclusive territories.
The Third Circuit had no difficulty finding that this system resulted in
a horizontal allocation because Holiday Inns was operating motels itself in
potential competition with its franchisees. The court stated:
In the present case, since HI [Holiday Inns], in one of its capacities, was
dealing on the same market level as its franchisees, its contracts that, in
effect, foreclosed such franchises from operating either Holiday Inns or
non-Holiday Inns in cities where HI operated an Inn, except with HI's
permission, constitute market allocation agreements among compet-
titors.53
The court found that acts by a franchisor, such as Holiday Inns, which cre-
ated an otherwise unreasonable restraint of trade "[were] not insulated from
the antitrust laws by the fact that such company functions as a franchisor as
well as a motel operator. ' ' 4
Finally, in Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co.,58 which involved a
class certification order, the court addressed the question of whether a li-
censing arrangement, in which manufacturer-licensees were granted exclu-
sive territories, constituted a horizontal allocation because the licensor was
also a manufacturer reserving to itself certain exclusive territories in ques-
tion. In that case, Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Company licensed manufac-
turers to manufacture Baskin-Robbins ice cream in assigned, exclusive terri-
tories. It also licensed its wholly-owned subsidiary Baskin-Robbins, Inc., a
manufacturer of Baskin-Robbins ice cream, to market in a number of the
exclusive territories. The court stated that if Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream
Company did nothing more than license others to manufacture Baskin-Rob-
bins ice cream, the allocation would be vertical." But, the court stated, Bas-
51. 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975).
52. Id. at 1235.
53. Id. at 1254.
54. Id. at 1253-54.
55. 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
56. Id. at 123 (citing Tomac, Inc. v. The Coca Cola Co., 418 F. Supp. 359 (C.D. Cal.
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kin-Robbins Ice Cream Company was not strictly a franchisor; it was con-
nected to the manufacture and supply of Baskin-Robbins ice cream
products through its subsidiary which operated in certain of the exclusive
territories." "An entity occupying such a dual role is forbidden per se from
imposing territorial market restrictions.""
The courts in each of the above-mentioned horizontal trademark license
cases have applied the per se rule of liability. Although the facts demon-
strating the horizontal nature of the allocation scheme varied in Timken,'
Holiday Inns6" and Krehl,e1 the courts applied a functional analysis which
considered the line of business in which the parties engaged as well as the
fact that the licensor in each case reserved to itself certain of the exclusive
territories in question." Moreover, in Sealys and Topco," the licensor was
in fact controlled by the licensees, and the Supreme Court firmly rejected
the rule of reason analysis notwithstanding the presence of an intrabrand
restrictive arrangement." The cases strongly suggest that a licensor's at-
tempts to control competitive conditions, whether intrabrand or interbrand,
on a level in which the licensor functions, will result in an application of per
se principles of liability.
The strongest attack on this per se approach in recent years was made
by the defendant in Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc.6 The Sev-
enth Circuit rejected the argument that an intrabrand allocation should be
tested by the rule of reason and not the per se rule."
In United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., supra, however, the Court
rejected exactly this argument in the context of horizontal restraints, 405
U.S. at 610-11, and the Sylvania decision expressly reaffirmed that rejec-
tion. 433 U.S. at 57, n.27. A horizontal agreement among potential com-
1976)).
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing American Motors Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1254 (5th
Cir. 1975)). Following trial, the court found that the plaintiff-franchise owners failed to
"demonstrate concerted action to create or maintain the system among entities acting as com-
petitors or potential competitors." Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., [1979-2 Trade
Cases] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,806, at 78,703 (C.D. Cal. 1979). The plaintiffs, according to
the court, failed to show indicia of any abuse of a competitive relationship, such as "adherence
to the system," exertion of power in the selection process and veto power. Id.
59. 341 U.S. 593 (1951). See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
60. 521 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1975). See text accompanying notes 51-54 supra.
61. 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978). See text accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
62. See, e.g., id. at 123. See also American Motors Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521
F.2d 1230, 1254 (5th Cir. 1975).
63. 388 U.S. 350 (1967). See text accompanying notes 40-44 supra.
64. 405 U.S. 596 (1972). See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
65. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); United States v. Sealey, Inc.,
388 U.S. 350, 355 (1967).
66. 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979).
67. Id. at 830.
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petitors to develop a national brand and not to compete with each other
in selling it is, we think, considerably more suspect than limitations im-
posed by a single independent manufacturer on its distributors as a con-
dition of their distributorships, but even if we were inclined to agree with
Sealy's argument to the contrary, we believe the Supreme Court has fore-
closed that approach.68
It is apparent that the courts as well as Congress," as evidenced by the
amendment to the Lanham Act7 0 introduced in 1961, have rejected the in-
trabrand-interbrand distinction that has long been espoused by defendants
in territorial allocation cases. Sylvania7 1 apparently does not change this re-
sult. In fact, the Court in Sylvania gave substantial weight to congressional
intent in repealing the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts in concluding that
vertical price restrictions would continue to be treated as per se violations.7 2
There is every reason to believe that a similar conclusion of congressional
intent should dictate continued application of the per se rule to horizontal
nonprice restrictions.
C. Horizontal Allocation at the Distributor Level
A horizontal allocation may also occur at the distributor or secondary
level thus converting what might otherwise appear to be a vertical allocation
into a horizontal allocation requiring per se treatment. In this category of
cases the impetus for the allocation often comes from the distributors com-
peting at the secondary level. The principal issue is whether the per se rule
should apply and in what circumstances.
A leading case in this area is United States v. General Motors Corp.,78
in which Chevrolet dealers, operating pursuant to "location clauses,'7 " com-
plained to Chevrolet about discount houses selling new cars at bargain
prices. The cars sold by discount houses were purchased through licensed
Chevrolet dealers. A number of dealers complained to Chevrolet about the
68. Id. at 831 (citations omitted).
69. See Hearings on S. 1396 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copy-
rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1961).
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976).
71. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See text accompanying notes 1-24 supra.
72. Id. at 52 n.18. The Court stated that:
Congress recently has expressed its approval of a per se analysis of vertical price
restrictions by repealing those provisions of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts
allowing fair-trade pricing at the option of the individual states. Consumer Goods
Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a). No similar expres-
sion of congressional intent exists for nonprice restrictions.
433 U.S. at 52 n.18.
73. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
74. The location clauses prohibited "a dealer from moving to or establishing 'a new or
different location, branch sales office, branch service station, or place of business including any
used car lot or location without prior written approval of Chevrolet.'" Id. at 130.
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practice and requested assistance to stop it. A letter was then sent out by
the defendant informing errant dealers that sales to discount houses repre-
sented the establishment of a second "unauthorized" sales outlet or location
contrary to the provisions of the dealership agreement. An agreement was
obtained from each that such unauthorized sales would cease. The dealers
joined together to police all dealers to be certain each was adhering to the
agreement. The defendant General Motors participated in this policing at
the request of the non-participating dealers.
General Motors argued that it was unilaterally enforcing the location
clauses of its dealership agreements and thus was not violating the Sherman
Act.7 5 The Court declined to pass on the territorial allocation aspects of the
case, but rather treated the case as a per se boycott case directed against the
discount houses. The Court stated:
We have here a classic conspiracy in restraint of trade: joint, collabora-
tive action by dealers, the appellee associations, and General Motors to
eliminate a class of competitors by terminating business dealings be-
tween them and a minority of Chevrolet dealers and to deprive
franchised dealers of their freedom to deal through discounters if they so
choose.7 6
The Court emphasized the presence of collaborative action between the
dealers which was spearheaded by General Motors.7 7 Thus, the Court char-
acterized the restraint as horizontal rather than vertical, and applied a con-
ventional per se rule.78
In White Motor Co. v. United States,7 the defendant granted its dis-
tributors exclusive territories to sell defendant's trucks. In addition to the
exclusive territories each dealer agreed not to sell trucks to any federal or
state government or any department or political subdivision thereof, unless
the right to do so was specifically granted by the defendant in writing. The
government attacked the customer restriction clauses as per se illegal. The
Court declined on summary judgment to rule whether the practices at-
tacked, the territorial and customer restrictions, arising as they did in a
"vertical arrangement," 80 were per se illegal. The Court stated "we know too
little of the actual impact of both that [vertical territorial] restriction and
the one respecting customers to reach a conclusion on the bare bones of the
documentary evidence before us."8'
However, Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion,' 2 noted that if the
75. Id. at 140.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 143.
78. Id. at 145.
79. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
80. Id. at 261.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 264 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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impetus for the territorial restrictions came from the distributors then a
horizontal allocation would have been demonstrated calling for per se
treatment.
Territorial limitations bear at least a superficial resemblance to horizon-
tal divisions of markets among competitors, which we have held to be
tantamount to agreements not to compete, and hence inevitably violative
of the Sherman Act, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341
U.S. 593. If it were clear that the territorial restrictions involved in this
case had been induced solely or even primarily by appellant's dealers and
distributors, it would make no difference to their legality that the restric-
tions were formally imposed by the manufacturer rather than through
inter-dealer agreement. 83
In Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America," Sony distributors pressured
Sony into enforcing otherwise non-exclusive territorial boundaries between
distributors by establishing a "warranty fee" which was exacted for each
extraterritorial sale, irrespective of an actual provision of warranty service.
At the time, Sony was the fifth largest manufacturer of office dictation
equipment in the United States, with a national market share of twelve per
cent; Sony and the top four manufacturers accounted for ninety-six percent
of national sales. In 1975, Sony altered the warranty fee provisions in its
dealership contracts to require fee payments for extraterritorial sales; and
Sony, in effect, acted as a clearinghouse in identifying dealers making such
sales, and as an enforcer, exacting fee payments on behalf of "invaded"
dealers. The court found that a horizontal allocation existed at the distribu-
tors level rather than with Sony. The court stated, "it is of no consequence
that the conspiracy, although horizontal in its impetus was imposed in a
vertical fashion by enlisting the manufacturer." ' Quoting from Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion in White Motor,8 6 the court concluded:
"Therefore, where dealers enter into an implicit agreement effecting or im-
plementing an anticompetitive scheme, it makes no difference with respect
to its illegality that Sony, itself not a dealer, was the one whose acts were
needed to put the program into effect. '67
No doubt the critical issue in these types of cases, involving as they do
ostensibly allocative activity by the manufacturer, is the characterization of
the manufacturer's participation in the restraint. If, as in General Motors"
83. Id. at 267 (citations omitted).
84. 459 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.NY. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir.
1980).
85. Id. at 1284.
86. 372 U.S. at 267.
87. 459 F. Supp. at 1284. The court, on appeal, affirmed the district court on the basis of
the warranty fee plan's unreasonable restraint on intrabrand competition without any demon-
strably significant increase in interbrand competition, and did not reach the horizontal re-
straint issues. 622 F.2d at 1075 & n.9.
88. 384 U.S. 127 (1966). See text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
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and Eiberger," the distributors clearly implement the restraint, then it
should be characterized as horizontal and per se analysis should be applied.
However, the difficult problem arises in situations where the manufacturer's
involvement in the restraint is at least ambiguous; a question unresolved by
Sylvania. Clearly, of course, if the manufacturer unilaterially imposes the
restraint, and the restraint improves the manufacturer's competitive pos-
ture, Sylvania" dictates that the rule of reason should be applied. However,
the Court in Sylvania did not discuss the difficult problem of ascertaining
whether a particular restraint was imposed by a dealer's cartel or by a man-
ufacturer.9 1 As discussed later, where it appears that the manufacturer or
supplier is largely indifferent to a restraint and the distributors are the prin-
cipal beneficiaries of the restraint, or if there is other evidence of an actual
or potential dealer's cartel, the per se rule should be applied.
D. Dual Distribution Allocations
Between the horizontal allocation at the manufacturer level and the
horizontal allocation at the distributor level lies the dual distribution alloca-
tion.'2 A dual distribution allocation involves a single manufacturer licensing
its distributors to sell its products and granting to each an exclusive terri-
tory in which to sell. To this extent, the allocation is vertical. At the same
time, however, the manufacturer reserves to itself certain distributorships or
exclusive territories and thereby competes on the same level with its inde-
pendent distributors. To this extent, the allocation of territories becomes
horizontal. The question then arises as to whether this type of allocation is
subject to per se liability or to the rule of reason. The Supreme Court in
White Motor 3 was presented with a similar question, but did not pass on
the issue. There, distributors were given exclusive territories and categories
of customers to which they might sell." Although White Motor did not re-
tain any of the territories for itself, it did reserve for itself the exclusive
right to sell to state and federal agencies and certain national accounts. To
that extent it was horizontally competing with its distributors and there was
an allocation of the customer market. The Court treated the allocation as a
wholly vertical arrangement and did not pass on the horizontal aspects of
the customer allocation." Because the case was before the Court on sum-
mary judgment, the Court declined to pass on the important questions
89. 459 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See text accompanying notes 83-86 supra.
90. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See text accompanying notes 1-24 supra.
91. See id. at 57-58 & n.28.
92. See Note, Antitrust Treatment of Intrabrand Territorial Restraints Within a Dual
Distribution System, 56 Mx. L. REv. 1486, 1489 (1978).
93. 372 U.S. 253 (1963). See text accompanying notes 78-82 supra.
94. Id. at 255-56.
95. Id. at 260.
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before it without the benefit of a full evidentiary record."6
However, when directly confronted with the issue of whether the dual
distribution system involves horizontal conduct violative of section one of
the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has answered in the affirmative. In
United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.,' the defendant was a large
drug manufacturer which distributed through numerous independent whole-
sale outlets as well as through direct sales to retailers. Defendant entered
fair trade agreements with the independent wholesalers binding the latter to
sell at wholesale prices fixed by it. "Each of these independent wholesalers
is in direct competition with the McKesson wholesale division from which it
buys.""8 The Miller-Tydings Act" and the McGuire Act100 were noted by
the Court to permit the setting of resale prices as an exemption to the anti-
trust laws provided such was not done "between manufacturers, or between
producers, or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between factors,
or between retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in competi-
tion with each other." '10
1
The Court first determined that the defendant lost its exemption under
the "fair-trade" laws10 2 because it was also a wholesaler competing against
its licensed independent wholesalers. However, the defendant argued, and
the district court agreed, "that what would be illegal if done between com-
peting independent wholesalers becomes legal if done between an indepen-
dent wholesaler and a competing wholesaler who is also the manufacturer of
the brand product. 10 3 Defendant argued, "[t]his is so . . .because in con-
tracting with independent wholesalers it acted solely as a manufacturer sell-
ing to buyers rather than as a competitor of these buyers."' " The Court
construed the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts and stated that those Acts
expressly continue "the prohibitions of the Sherman Act against 'horizontal'
price fixing by those in competition with each other at the same functional
level."108 "Since appellee [defendant] competes 'at the same functional level'
with each of the 94 wholesalers with whom it has price-fixing agreements,
the proviso prevents these agreements from falling within the statutory
exemption." 1 6
96. Id. at 261.
97. 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
98. Id. at 308.
99. Act of August 17, 1937, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (repealed by Pub. L. 94-145
(1975)).
100. Act of July 14, 1952, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 631 (1952) (repealed by Pub. L. 94-145 (1975)).
101. 351 U.S. at 311 (emphasis by the Court).
102. See notes 99-100 supra.
103. 351 U.S. at 312.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 313 (quoting Schwegan Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 389
(1951)).
106. Id. at 313. See United States v. Ciba Geigy Corp., [1976-1 Trade Cases] TRADE REG.
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The McKesson10 7 case thus recognized the horizontal nature of competi-
tion between a manufacturer competing against its own distributors on the
same functional level. This case became the basis for a number of dual dis-
tribution allocations cases which relied on the same rationale in ruling that
a per se horizontal allocation existed.
The first lower court decision to consider the dual distribution system
in this context was Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp.08 In that case, plain-
tiff, a distributor of photographic equipment, entered into a contract with
the defendant Minolta Corporation which provided that there were thirteen
states in which plaintiff was prohibited from selling Minolta products. "This
area included states where Minolta acted as its own distributor and sold its
products directly to dealers."' 0 Minolta entered into similar agreements
with other distributors, "prohibiting them from selling Minolta products in
certain geographic areas."110 The court found that Minolta had combined
and conspired to divide and allocate geographic markets at the distributor
level with the independant Minolta distributors. "This appears on the face
of the sales agreement with Interphoto [plaintiff]," as well as in the agree-
ments entered into with the other distributors.' The court concluded that
the "effect of such contracts is to eliminate competition among the distribu-




In Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp.," s a Seventh Circuit
decision, the plaintiff, a terminated dealer, alleged inter alia, that the defen-
dant Beech Aircraft entered a conspiracy with its distributors to territorially
divide the United States into exclusive territories. Beech Aircraft also oper-
ated some of the distributor companies itself. Plaintiff claimed, and the evi-
dence showed, that it sought to operate as a dealer in a territory assigned to
an independent distributor. When the independent distributor refused to
grant the dealership, plaintiff turned to Beech Aircraft, which also refused,
declining "to deviate from its established marketing setup through distribu-
RlrR. 1 60,908 (D.N.J. 1976), in which the court relied on McKesson & Robbins, 351 U.S. 305
(1956), in ruling that supply agreements of the defendant Ciba Geigy with other drug compa-
nies whereby it limited the range of uses to which the purchasers were entitled to put the
vended material, constituted a horizontal restraint because the restrictions in question limited
the purchaser's ability to compete with Ciba Geigy which sold in the same market. Id. at
68,969. The court stated that where it is shown that "a vertically imposed restraint is intended
to suppress horizontal competition, the court will treat the agreement as the equivalent of a
horizontal restraint of trade." Id. (citations omitted).
107. 351 U.S. 305 (1956). See text accompanying notes 96-105 supra.
108. 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969).
109. Id. at 715.
110. Id. at 715-16.
111. Id. at 719-20.
112. Id. at 720. The court entered a preliminary injunction against Minolta foreclosing it
from refusing to sell photographic equipment to the plaintiff and from terminating plaintiff as
a distributor. Id. at 724.
113. 432 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1970).
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tors."1 " The court held that the agreement between Beech Aircraft, acting
as a distributor itself, and its independent distributors constituted a hori-
zontal arrangement which was per se illegal.1 1
5
In reaching this result, the court interestingly relied on Justice Bren-
nan's concurring opinion in White Motor" 6 wherein he stated that if "the
territorial restrictions in the case were induced solely or even primarily by
[White Motor's] dealers and distributors, it would make no difference to
their legality that the restrictions were formally imposed by the manufac-
turer rather than through inter-dealer agreement.1 1 7 The Seventh Circuit
noted, however, that although the case before it scarcely seemed "to be that
of the tail wagging the dog, such as apparently was involved in United
States v. Sealy, Inc.," '1 s still "there was sufficient evidence for the jury's
consideration of concerted horizontal action, participated in by Beech." ''
The Fifth Circuit, in Hobart Brothers Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland,
Inc.,12 0 decided the same issue three years later. In that case Gilliland was a
distributor of Hobart and in the original distributor agreement was granted
the exclusive territory of northern Georgia. The agreement also provided
that Gilliland could not solicit orders outside its assigned territory. The
agreement was subsequently amended and plaintiff was granted areas of pri-
mary responsibility rather than exclusive territories. The court noted that a
dual relationship existed in that Hobart both sold to Gilliland, its distribu-
tor, as well as sold directly from its home office "in competition with its own
distributors. 1 2' Gilliland began selling Hobart products outside its assigned
area in competition with the defendant Hobart, which subsequently led to
the termination of Gilliland as a distributor.
In analyzing the distributor agreement which Hobart entered with all
its distributors, the court concluded that its effect was to eliminate competi-
tion between Hobart and its distributors. "The Hobart distribution agree-
ment, while appearing to allocate territory vertically, in fact, resulted in a
horizontal allocation between Hobart and its own distributors. Such an ar-
rangement must be treated as it operated in practice rather than 'as ar-
ranged by skillful drafting.'-22
114. Id. at 1083.
115. Id. at 1085.
116. 372 U.S. 253, 267 (1963). See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
117. 432 F.2d at 1085.
118. 388 U.S. 350 (1967). See text accompanying notes 40-44 supra.
119. 432 F.2d at 1085.
120. 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1973).
121. Id. at 897.
122. Id. at 899. Defendant argued that because there was no actual contract establishing
the territorial restrictions, it does not constitute a "contractual restraint in violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act." Id. The court rejected this argument, stating that a silent understanding, as
existed in that case, could have the same effect. "Hobart's intra-office correspondence, which
was introduced into evidence, shows clearly that Hobart considered the distribution agreement
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The next case of importance is Pitchford v. Pepi, Inc.,12U decided by the
Third Circuit in 1976. Defendants in that case were North American Philips
Corporation, Philips Electronics Instruments and Philips Electronics &
Pharmaceutical Industries, all related to each other as a parent, subsidiary
or division. Plaintiff was made a distributor and given an exclusive territory
in the United States to distribute the defendant's sophisticated electronic
instruments for industrial and scientific use. The agreement specifically pre-
cluded plaintiff from selling outside its assigned territory, and some defen-
dants sold instruments at the distributor level in certain areas which had
been taken over from other distributors. " " Moreover, the evidence adduced
at trial revealed an elaborate enforcement procedure implemented by PEI to
discourage extraterritorial sales, and very active efforts by PEI to control
the quantity and quality of intrabrand competition in those products.12 8 The
court concluded that the jury could reasonably have found a horizontal re-
straint from the dual distribution system employed by defendants because a
"manufacturer cannot . . . police a division of markets for the benefit of
horizontal competitors."1 2
containing the primary responsibility clause to have the same effect as the prior distribution
agreement which contained outright territorial restrictions." Id. at 900.
123. 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1976).
124. Id. at 101-02. If a dealer sold outside its assigned territory, a portion of the sales
commission was given to the dealership, including the defendants when operating a dealership,
that had jurisdiction over the area where the buyer was located. Id. On occasion defendants
intervened at the behest of various dealerships to settle disputes over commissions and territo-
ries. Id.
125. Id. at 102-03. The court summarized the scope of defendants' restrictions in the fol-
lowing terms.
In the present case, there is evidence that PEI [defendants] responded to branch and
dealer complaints about sales made without regard to the territorial allocation and
actively sought to prevent entry by one dealer into another dealer's territory. If an
extra-territorial sale was consummated, the selling branch [defendants] or [indepen-
dent] dealer had to surrender all or a portion of its commission to the branch or
dealer having jurisdiction over the customer's place of business. In addition, the re-
cord reveals explicit agreement between PEI [defendants] and each dealer to divide
territories.
Id. at 104.
126. Id. at 103 (citing United States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596 (1972); American Motor Inns,
Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1975)).
Moreover, it was clear that the dual distribution plan had the effect of stifling imaginative
and aggressive marketing efforts by some dealers. For example, the plaintiff introduced into
evidence a letter from the PEI sales manager to a distributor angered over the latter's competi-
tion for a sale:
Phelan states he increasingly is running into [VWR] sales activity [in his terri-
tory] ....
I am also attaching recent correspondence from Pye Unicam alleging [VWR] try-
ing for Unicam business in Taiwan. Ted, this extra-curricular activity on the part of
your sale representatives speaks well for their aggressiveness. However, I would ap-
preciate it if you would investigate these two situations and let me know what plans
1980-81]
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In Dougherty v. Continental Oil Co.,12 7 the Fifth Circuit addressed the
issue of characterizing territorial restraints in a dual distribution situation.
That case arose out of efforts of Conoco to reshape its methods of marketing
gasoline in Texas. Prior to 1975, Conoco marketed in three ways: (1) it sold
gasoline directly to the public from its own gasoline stations; (2) it sold gaso-
line to independent jobbers who stored the gasoline in their own storage
facilities and resold to consumers and other distributors; and (3) it con-
signed gasoline, which was stored in Conoco's bulk facilities, to commission
agents who sold to service stations, municipalities and quantity consumers
such as farmers. In reorganizing its distribution system Conoco withdrew its
Conoco brand gasoline from the Texas market and commenced selling E-
Qual gasoline. The commission agents were informed that they could
purchase the bulk facilities, but before any sale was consumated Conoco was
approached by a number of jobbers who sought to purchase all of Conoco's
marketing facilities including the bulk plants. In working out the sale the
jobbers divided up the Conoco assets by geographic location, each jobber
selecting an area encompassing his existing area of operation. The commis-
sion agents subsequently sued under section one of the Sherman Act when
they learned they had been foreclosed from purchasing the bulk facilities.
In discussing the theories of liability, the court noted that the transac-
tion in question fit under the rubric of horizontal restraint. The court
stated:
Entities in a seemingly vertical relationship may be deemed capable of
horizontal restraints if they are actual or potential competitiors....
[S]ince Conoco operated bulk facilities and retail stations at the same
marketing level as the jobbers, the arrangement theoretically could be
given per se treatment as a horizontal market allocation among them.",8
Although the Court in Sylvania2" stated that "there may be occasional
problems in differentiating vertical restrictions from horizontal restrictions"
implemented by distributors, and that the latter would be per se illegal,
1 3 0
the Court did not indicate how to differentiate the supplier-imposed restric-
tion from the restrictions imposed by the supplier acting principally as a
dealer. More importantly, the opinion did not suggest any preferred treat-
ment for the usual situation in which a dual distributor seeks to maximize
you have for eliminating this inter-competition in the future.
531 F.2d at 102 (emphasis added).
127. 579 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1978).
128. Id. at 959. The court of appeals reversed a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs
on the ground that a Schwinn instruction was given to the jury which was improper in view of
the subsequently decided Sylvania case. Id. at 960. The court, however, made it clear that the
various theories of liability might be conclusive including the per se horizontal allocation of the
market. Id. at 962.
129. 433 U.S. 36 (1977), See text accompanying notes 1-24 supra.
130. Id. at 59 n.28. See text accomapnying notes 1-24 supra.
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both its position as a manufacturer (i.e., by stimulating interbrand competi-
tion) and as a dealer (by limiting intrabrand competition within any terri-
tory), but overreaches in its dealings with intrabrand competitiors.
E. Vertical Allocation of Markets
Although the Sylvania3 1 decision held that vertical territorial alloca-
tions must be tested against the rule of reason and stripped away the per se
rule of Schwinn,18 2 the Court also stated that some "applications of vertical
restrictions might justify per se prohibition under Northern Pac. Ry. Co. "s3
Subsequent commentary has speculated on the types of vertical restrictions
which might warrant continued per se treatment,"' and recent judicial deci-
sions have begun the process of sharpening the lines drawn in Sylvania. For
example, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its message in Sylvania
that vertical price restrictions will be considered as per se violations3 5 of the
Sherman Act,'8 notwithstanding the clearly applicable "free rider" analysis
relied upon in Sylvania. 8 7
Another situation suggesting the application of the per se rule is where
the vertical territorial allocation was ancillary or created to support a second
per se violation. The Court in Schwinn stated that if the vertical restrictions
"were part of a scheme involving unlawful price fixing, the result would be a
per se violation of the Sherman Act."' 8 There is no suggestion in the Sylva-
nia decision that this statement of law in Schwinn has been overruled.
Moreover, the Court in General Motors3 9 was confronted with a vertical
allocation of exclusive territories which were used to support a group boy-
131. Id. at 36.
132. 388 U.S. 365 (1976). See text accompanying notes 13-24 supra.
133. 433 U.S. at 58 (citation omitted).
134. See, e.g., Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Re-
strictions, 78 COLUM. L. REy. 1, 27-34 (1978) ("airtight" territorial confinement and customer
allocation); Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the
Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 953, 967-68 (1979) (vertical restraints which
promote pricing discipline or otherwise facilitate tightened oligopolistic interdependence);
Zelek, Stern & Dunfee, A Rule of Reason Decision Model After Sylvania, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 13
(1980) (vertical price fixing).
135. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 1925 (1980); California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 937 (1980).
136. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
137. Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, supra note 2, at 7-9. Professor Posner persua-
sively argues that the economic rationale of Sylvania cannot logically be limited to non-price
restrictions, and, indeed, can easily be extended to some horizontal restraints. Id. at 6-7, 9-12.
However, notwithstanding the seemingly logical extension of the Sylvania rationale to ver-
tical price restraints, the Court in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 100 S. Ct. 937 (1980), gave great weight to the contrary congressional intent behind the
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975. Id. at 942 n.6.
138. 388 U.S. at 373. See text accompanying notes 13-24 supra.
139. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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cott of car discount houses. The Court in that case had little difficulty in
finding that a per se violation had been committed, although the Court did
not analyze the extent to which the territorial allocation entered into its
decision."1 0 Thus, if a vertical allocation is ancillary to a price fixing or tie-in
scheme, it is submitted that a per se violation will be demonstrated entitling
the plaintiff to relief against both the territorial restriction as well as the
price fixing or tie-in restriction.
The Court's decision in Sylvania should be narrowly construed; not as a
blanket approval of vertical restraints, but rather as a specific approval of
vertical territorial restriction imposed solely by a struggling manufacturer
that is desirous of stimulating its competitive position with other brands. 41
More importantly, the Court's opinion should not be read as a wholesale
disapproval of the non-economic goals of the antitrust laws which the courts
and enforcement agencies have been advancing for almost ninety years. 4'
Sylvania can be most plausibly read to articulate a judicial concern that
antitrust rules and policies must be premised on the achievement of signifi-
cant goals-economic or otherwise-and that absent a concrete finding that
a horizontal or vertical restriction has or is likely to have a "pernicious effect
on competition"; or that it lacks "any redeeming virtue," the rule of reason
should apply.
IV. ANTITRUST POLICY AND GOALS: A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE PER SE
RULE
The Sylvania decision and its subsequent commentary have cast doubt
on the future of the per se rules' application to horizontal and vertical in-
trabrand restrictions. It is therefore necessary to consider the goals of the
antitrust laws and how those goals are instrumentalized in the policies of
the per se rule of liability and the rule of reason. Once the goals and policy
instruments are established, it is possible to critically re-examine the contin-
ued applicability of the per se rule to intrabrand nonprice restrictions and
to set forth a cogent form of analysis.
A. Goals of the Antitrust Laws
Recent literature is rich with theories of the goals of the antitrust laws.
Some commentators propose that the goal of the Sherman Act is the
140. Id. at 145.
141. See Bohling, A Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social
Goals, Economic Analysis, and Sylvania, 64 IOWA L. REv. 461 (1979) [hereinafter cited as A
Simplified Rule of Reason].
142. See notes 147-53 infra. Contra, Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977
SuP. CT. REv. 171, 172 ("A great deal of doctrinal baggage about the social purposes of these
laws ...was silently jettisoned.").
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achievement of economic efficiency in particular markets. 1 4 Other commen-
tators have concluded that maximization of consumer welfare is the singular
objective of the antitrust laws. " These conclusions stem from liberal read-
ings of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, 48 and from arguments
concerning the descriptive and predictive powers of allocative efficiency
criteria. 14
6
Other writers contend that social and political goals form the basis of
the antitrust laws and must be incorporated into any meaningful analysis. ' 7
These include political values such as antipathy to concentrated economic
power and protection from excessive interference with individual decision-
making,1 48 plus social values such as more pluralistic composition of markets
143. See, e.g., 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 11 104-112, at 8-31 (1978); R.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8-22 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ArrrTRuST
LAW].
144. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50-71
(1978) [hereinafter cited as THE ANTITRUST PARADOX].
145. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, 106, at 14-6 (1978); Bork, Legisla-
tive Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966).
146. See THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 144; ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 143.
147. See A Simplified Rule of Reason, supra note 141, at 465-70; Kauper, The "Warren
Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REv. 325
(1968).
148. See, e.g., Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM.
L. RE v. 422-66 (1965); Blake & Jones, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 377-400 (1965); Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051,
1052-58 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Pitofsky].
Pitofsky makes a principled, but guarded, argument, largely in the context of horizontal
merger policy, that incorporation of certain political values into antitrust policy is both feasible
and desirable. Pitofsky, 127 U. PA. L. REv. at 1065-67. However, that author expressly excludes
from consideration some important "non-economic concerns":
These include (1) protection for small businessmen against the rigors of competition,
(2) special rights for franchisees and other distributors to continuing access to a sup-
plier's products or services regardless of the efficiency of their distribution operation
and the will of the supplier (a kind of civil rights statute for distributors), and (3)
income redistribution to achieve social goals.
Id. at 1058.
Insofar as Pitofsky argues that these concerns are unprincipled and should not be antitrust
goals, he may be correct. And, he shares this belief with others. See, e.g., THE ANTITRUST PARA-
Dox, supra note 144. Congress, on the other hand, has repeatedly exhibited its willingness to
succor the small businessman, franchisee or distributor by enacting protectionist legislation
such as the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13a-13b, 21a (1976) (protecting small business
against effects of price discrimination caused by chain stores); and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, §§ 7, 19, 20 (to be codified in 15 U.S.C.
57a(a)(1)(B), 59, 60), which exempts certain industries from the rulemaking authority of the
Federal Trade Commission.
Moreover, Pitofsky would treat the preferred political concerns "as limited factors that
influence the way in which prospective rules are designed to accomplish antitrust objectives,"
or "as a tie-breaker in individual cases." Pitofsky, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1067 & n.44.
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and notions of distributive justice.14 Perhaps more importantly, the United
States Supreme Court has frequently recognized the existence of these
norms in setting antitrust policy. For example, the courts have repeatedly
expressed the important role of the antitrust laws in keeping markets atom-
istic,150 protecting "small dealers and worthy men" from large aggregations
of political and economic power,1 51 prohibiting "interference with individual
liberty of action in trading,"1 '' and accomodating or advancing distributive
justice by establishing and protecting individual and commercial "rights." '
A survey of the literature and the cases makes one point clear: There is
no unitary theory of antitrust goals; rather there is a myriad group of norms
which the courts and enforcement agencies must apply in each case and in
each formulation of policy. The recent scholarship suggesting that economic
efficiency is an antitrust goal has added greater clarity and precision to the
task of setting antitrust policy. However, it is narrow thinking to believe
that any one discipline can fulfill the task of defining the complete range of
policy in an area as complex as antitrust law. "
It is also clear that economic and non-economic goals may conflict in
application. However, the fact that goals conflict in application does not
warrant discarding all norms but one, or in presuming the primary impor-
tance of one norm. Rather, the courts should weigh each objective and bal-
ance all the goals in establishing policy. In many situations there is a conflict
149. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What
Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191 (1977); Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic
Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979).
150. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 318-19 (1949); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1945).
151. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897). See also
Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959).
152. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parks & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 406 (1911). Accord,
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951); United States
v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
153. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730 (1977) (unfair to expose
defendants to the threat of multiple liabilities arising out of the same conduct); Silver v. New
York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (victim of anticompetitive acts by self-regulating indus-
try is entitled to same minimum procedural due process).
154. Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources of
Wisdom for Antitrust, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214, 1232-43 (1977). The limits of the predictive
ability of economic analysis was recently addressed by G. Warren Nutter when he admonished
that "there is a danger that some economists may become dizzy with success and claim too
much for their discipline and too little for other social sciences." Nutter, On Economism, 22
J.L. & EcON. 263, 263 (1979). Nutter's concern was that the euphoria created by recent suc-
cesses of the "economic approach" was creating the false illusion that the approach was capable
of "universal application ... to analysis of human behavior and social activity." Id. at 264.
Further, the Justices' opinions in Sylvania reflect the obvious fact that there is little unity
of thought among the proponents of the economic approach to antitrust law. Compare 433 U.S.
at 57 & nn.26 & 27 (Powell, J.) with 433 U.S. at 69-71 (White, J., concurring).
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between economic efficiency objectives and non-economic goals, 38 but those
situations are not inevitable. When these goals conflict the courts must per-
form their historical function of selecting those values which reflect legisla-
tive intent, institutional competency and public policy.18 6
Before considering an integrated approach to distributional problems, it
is helpful to briefly consider current antitrust policies.
B. Antitrust Policy
Judicial decision-making in the antitrust field relies upon two forms or
expressions of policy; the rule of reason and the per se rule. These policies
have important procedural and substantive distinctions which have been re-
fined by the courts since the late 1800's.
Per se rules of liability reflect a judicial decision that a particular re-
straint has, in most applications, no redeeming virtues or value, and that the
restraint should be condemned on its face, irrespective of the defendant's
purpose in implementing the restraint or of any arguable procompetitive ef-
fects.1 57 A court applying the per se rule will balance all social and economic
155. A Simplified Rule of Reason, supra note 141, at 476-77; Elzinga, The Goals of Anti-
trust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1191,
1194-95 (1977).
156. See Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources
of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1214, 1242-43 (1977).
157. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 (1977).
Although the Court in Sylvania frequently cited the standard articulation of the per se
rule in Northern Pacific (i.e., "pernicious effect on competition and lack of redeeming virtue"),
the Court went on to add that "[c]ases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a per se
rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify
the time and expense necessary to identify them." 433 U.S. at 50 n.16.
This refinement on the Northern Pacific standard seems principally to be a matter of de-
gree. However, it suggests that the Court is more sensitive to countervailing procompetitive
effects, and concomitantly more reticent to invoke the per se rule of liability. Other recent
decisions reflect greater judicial care inefashioning appropriate antitrust policy. For example, in
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), the Court considered whether defendants'
blanket license rule should be characterized as per se illegal, and stated:
[Ojur inquiry must focus on whether the effect and, here because it tends to show
effect, the purpose of the practice is to threaten the proper operation of our predomi-
nantly free market economy-that is, whether the practice facially appears to be one
that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output,
and in what portion of the market, or instead one designed to "increase economic
efficiency and render markets more rather than less competitive."
Id. at 19-20 (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13, 441 n.16
(1978)). See also National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691
(1978).
It is also possible to infer that the Sylvania Court's reformulated per se standard includes
a greater concern for non-price restraints which have arguably procompetitive effects in some
now insubstantial number of situations, but in which the effects can be achieved by less restric-
tive alternatives. Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Re-
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factors concerning the activity and determine if, on balance, it is most likely
to offend antitrust goals and if, in practice, any beneficial aspects will be
difficult to ascertain.1 "
A rule of reason analysis involves a more flexible rule; recognizing that
in application many restraints have socially and economically valuable at-
tributes, and that courts should in each instance carefully evaluate the at-
tributes and any detrimental aspects.159 When a restraint has greater capac-
ity for achievement of important goals, or where other compelling goals are
advanced by the restraint, then the courts will not presume illegality, but
rather will evaluate each restraint on an individual basis. 160
The preceding summary of the rule of reason and per se rule methodol-
ogies should indicate that the appropriate policy in each case depends upon
a careful balancing of the likelihood that a particular distributional restraint
will achieve a desired objective with the least possible adverse effect on com-
petition or competitors. In other words, when a restraint has a substantial
likelihood of achieving a desirable economic objective, and the prospect that
the restraint will adversely affect important economic and non-economic
goals articulated by the antitrust laws is very small and there are no ade-
quate lesser restrictive alternatives, then the practice should be analyzed
under the rule of reason."" It is important, however, to recognize that the
decision of whether to apply per se or reasonableness policy depends, in
strictions, 78 COLuM. L. Rav. 1, 14 (1978). The Court's reasoning in Broadcast Music, suggests
that the lack of less restrictive alternatives available to the defendants justified the use of a
blanket license rule, and that per se treatment was unwarranted under the circumstances. 441
U.S. at 19-20.
158. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.16 (1977). See United
States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972).
159. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
160. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979); National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
The Court has, particularily in recent years, treated a few restraints which may affect
prices under the rule of reason. For example, decisions by professional associations which estab-
lish "ethical norms" may fall within the rule of reason. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978). Similarily, the Court has declared that private, non-
governmental groups that perform licensing activities may have these activities considered
under the rule of reason, especially where the restrictions are narrowly drawn, have substan-
tially procompetitive effects, are applied in a non-discriminatory fashion, and there are no
lesser restrictive alternatives. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
161. Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions,
78 COLuM. L. Rov. 1, 13 (1978).
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each instance, on judicial solicitude to all objectives of the Sherman Act."'
C. An Analysis of Intrabrand Restrictions and the Per Se Rule
In the context of the antitrust laws' policies and goals and the issues
left unanswered in Sylvania,1 63 it is helpful to reformulate our thinking
about the per se rule's application to non-price intrabrand restrictions. This
re-examination is particularly useful now because of the Court's recent
statements that the per se rule has great vitality in the area of intrabrand
price restrictions,'" and, more particularly, that the per se rule should be
applied only where the courts have great confidence that the restraint serves
no useful purpose.'"
In analyzing an intrabrand non-price restraint, a, court should consider
several factors in determining whether the rule of reason or the per se rule
should apply. Each restraint should be examined for its probable or actual
effect on interbrand competition, its purpose, and its ability to advance or
retard the objectives of the antitrust laws. A careful balancing of these fac-
tors should indicate, within an acceptable degree of probability, that a par-
ticular intrabrand restriction is likely to have a "pernicious effect on compe-
tition" and lack "any redeeming virtue," and concentration on these factors
avoids resort to "formalistic line drawing" such as the origin of the
restriction. ' "
The initial inquiry concerns the presence of any pro-competitive effects
of the restraint and, in particular, whether the restraint fosters greater in-
162. The Court in Sylvania strongly suggested that non-economic criteria, such as social
or political goals, should no longer be considerations in antitrust decision-making because they
offer no "objective benchmarks." 433 U.S. at 53 n.21. Aside from the dubious validity of the
statement, it is important to note the Court's failure to distinguish the absolute inability of one
discipline or science to perform in a predictive manner from a lack of developmental maturity.
It is likely that the recent interdisciplinary scholarship between economists and academic law-
yers that strongly influenced the Sylvania Court presages similar interdisciplinary efforts with
sociologists, political scientists and organization behaviorists. See, e.g., Williamson, Assessing
Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127
U. PA. L. REv. 953 (1979). It is therefore distinctly probable that social and political objectives
will provide "objective benchmarks" for establishing antitrust policy.
Finally, it should be remembered that the economic efficiency criterion has only recently
reached its pinnacle. A mere eight years ago the Court expressed grave doubts about the ability
of courts "to ramble through the wilds of economic theory" in fashioning antitrust policies.
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 n.10 (1972). See also Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 742 (1977).
163. See notes 23 & 24 supra & accompanying text.
164. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 100 S. Ct. 937 (1980).
165. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
166. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977). The somewhat
artificial distinction between vertical restraints and horizontal restraints often clouds the im-
portant issue of a restraint's effect on competition and competitors, and perhaps more fre-
quently fails to examine the reason for such restraint. The suggested analysis does not rely on
such a distinction.
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terbrand competition. Where the benefits to interbrand competition clearly
outweigh any offsetting decreases to intrabrand competition, the restraint
should be viewed favorably and subject to proof that the restriction was not
unilaterally imposed by the manufacturer or supplier to protect its trade-
mark.'1 7 This would require an evaluation of the relative intensity of the
restriction, the presence of a demonstrable purpose or motive to advance or
protect a legitimate interest in a trademark, the availability of less restric-
tive methods for protecting the manufacturer's interest, and the net compet-
itive effect of the restriction. Thus, in most situations a manufacturer does
not need exclusive territorial arrangements to stimulate interbrand competi-
tion, and less restrictive alternatives such as pass-over profit clauses or area
of primary responsibility clauses are sufficient to advance the manufac-
turer's interest.1 Similarly, where a manufacturer is a new market entrant
and imposes moderate restrictions on its distributors in an effort to improve
its competitive position and that of its dealers, the court should analyze the
restraint under a reasonableness standard."6 '
For example, in Eiberger v. Sony Corp.,'7" the Second Circuit concluded
that the vertical restriction, a warranty fee plan that operated like a strict
ban on extraterritorial sales, was much more restrictive than a prior war-
ranty fee arrangement which encouraged some interterritorial competi-
tion. 171 Moreover, the court emphasized that the intrabrand restriction may
be unreasonable even where there is no ostensible improvement in inter-
brand competition,17' and that the defendant's twelve percent market share
167. A difficult problem in these cases is, of course, satisfactory proof of net interbrand
competition gain. However, some suggested approaches to these situations, which are almost
invariable vertically-imposed territorial or customer restraints, should provide great assistance
to the courts in evaluating the evidence, particularily with respect to allocating evidentiary
burdens. See, e.g., Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, supra note 2; Zelek, Stern & Dunfee,
A Rule of Reason Decision Model After Sylvania, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 13 (1980).
168. For example, compare the exclusivity of the restrictions in Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) and United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 597 (1972).
Furthermore, as Pitofsky points out, there are many types of distributional restrictions
which vary in the intensity. Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Ver-
tical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1978). A change in type of restriction from moder-
ate to intensive or "airtight" should indicate greater judicial scrutiny, especially when the man-
ufacturer has less restrictive alternatives available which would accomplish the same thing. Id.
at 28-31. Similarly, certain goods, such as "convenience goods," and some dealer services such
as many post-sale services, do not require exclusive or intense restrictions to be effective. The
Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HsAv. L. REv. 70, 236 (1977).
169. New market entrants, or existing firms with flagging market shares, should be per-
mitted greater flexibility in structuring their distributional efforts because, as the Sylvania
Court stressed, a reasonableness standard protects many small businessmen and militates
against market concentration by making vertical integration more unlikely. Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 56-57 n.26.
170. 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980), af'g, 459 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
171. Id. at 1079-80.
172. Id. at 1081.
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did not entitle it to special antitrust treatment as a "new entrant." ' Con-
versely, in Hobart Bros. Co. v. Gilliland, Inc.,174 the manufacturer, a com-
petitor of the distributor with respect to a complimentary good, imposed a
primary responsibility clause in its agreement, subsequently began to expe-
rience problems with the distributor's service to a major account and took
over the account itself. A couple of years later the manufacturer terminated
the distributorship. Although the court stated that the manufacturer's inter-
nal documents showed that the manufacturer treated the clause as having
the same effect as a strict territorial restriction, the evidence clearly sug-
gested that the restraint was reasonable under the circumstances, that the
manufacturer's action did not hamper competitive conditions in the relevant
market, that the manufacturer lacked any significant power to affect the
market, and that mere competition in a related product market is not tanta-
mount to a finding of horizontal conspiracy in the relevant market.
Second, the court should determine if there is any indication that a
manufacturer's or dealer's cartel is responsible for the restriction. The Court
in Sylvania expressed confidence that cartel agreements would continue to
receive per se treatment, apparently notwithstanding the use of least restric-
tive distributional restraints.1 78 However, difficulties may arise, first, where a
particular restraint may improve interbrand competition but is the result of
cartel agreement, and, second, where the evidence of cartel agreement is
equivocal at best.
A court should not be deterred by difficulties of proof, but rather should
evaluate all evidence of the existence or possibility of cartel agreement, and
declare any demonstrated or probable agreement unlawful on its face.17
The Sherman Act was intended to prohibit cartel activity because an agree-
ment would permit firms with little or no individual ability to affect market
conditions to collectively accomplish that goal, and because cartel agree-
ments have utility in curbing competitive behavior, by limiting the range of
conduct by cartel members, and by serving as a potent weapon to deter non-
group members from entering the market or competing effectively. 1 7
Therefore, the courts should declare illegal per se intrabrand territorial
173. Id. at 1080-81.
174. 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1973).
175. The Court stated:
There may be occasional problems in differentiating vertical restrictions from hori-
zontal restrictions originating in agreements among the retailers. There is no doubt
that restrictions in the latter category would be illegal per se ..., but we do not
regard the problems of proof as sufficiently great to justify a per se rule.
433 U.S. at 58 n.28.
176. See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 150 (1959); ANTITRUST LAW, SUPRA
note 143, at 55-77; Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HAv. L. REV. 655 (1962).
177. L. SULLIVAN, ANTrrUsT, 161-65 (1977); McGee, Cartels: Organization and Func-
tions, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 191 (1960).
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restrictions which stem from agreements among manufacturers or suppliers
which have an effect on, or a purpose to affect, prices or which unreasonably
limit the range of decision-making by parties to the agreement. The agree-
ments in United States v. Sealy, Inc.,17 8 United States v. Topco Associ-
ates, 1 7 American Motors Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,'80 and Krehl v.
Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 8" had the plausible purpose of improving
the defendants' competitive position with other brands. However, the agree-
ments were clearly more restrictive than necessary to protect the collabora-
tor's interest in the trademark, often involving exclusive territorial restric-
tions.182 Moreover, the restrictive agreements were undertaken to unduly
limit the range of commercial behavior of the parties to the agreement and
often served as an extrajudicial device to discipline members.' 83 For exam-
ple, in Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v. Sealy, Inc.,'" Sealy used
a variety of otherwise proper trade restraints to effectively harness Ohio-
Sealy, an extremely aggressive and competent manufacturer and distributor,
in order to protect the other manufacturers. While there may be significant
improvements to some manufacturer's ability to compete against other
brands by the territorial restrictions, the likelihood of achievement of such
improvements is relatively insignificant and the danger is great that the col-
laborators will begin to discuss price.
Similar problems of proof may arise when a manufacturer is imposing
particular restraints for the benefit of, and at direction of, a group of dis-
tributors. A cartel of distributors may use a manufacturer to keep aggressive
dealers in check or to discipline them, or to apply pressure to discontinue
dealings with discounters. These cartel activities may exert an obvious effect
on the price charged for the product, the relative fairness with which a man-
ufacturer may treat a particular dealer, and, indeed, the ability of a manu-
facturer to remain in business.185 Thus, for example, powerful dealers in
United States v. General Motors Corp.1"6 and Eiberger v. Sony Corp.,
18 7
were able to exert significant collective pressure on the manufacturer to de-
stroy intrabrand competition by members dealing with discounters or unau-
thorized distributors. Similarly, the effect of a dealer's cartel was evident in
178. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
179. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
180. 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975).
181. 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Krehl v. Baskin-Rob-
bins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); American Motors Inns,
Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975).
184. 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979).
185. The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HAtv. L. REV. 70, 236-39 (1977).
186. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
187. 459 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afl'd, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Fontana Aviation Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,18 8 where a powerful dealer
was able to use the manufacturer to discipline the plaintiff for seeking to
bypass dealings with the dealer by seeking direct dealings with the manufac-
turer to obtain a wider offering of aircraft. Finally, the restrictions in Ameri-
can Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc.'8 9 were a collaborative effort by
dealers, including Holiday Inns, to limit the number of available motels.
Clearly, there may be advantages to interbrand competition from such hori-
zontally-imposed territorial restrictions."" But, there is a greater likelihood
that the restrictions will tend to limit other procompetitive activities, affect
pricing and service decisions, and limit consumer access to certain goods ei-
ther on the basis of price or location. Furthermore, horizontal and vertical
cartel agreements, like resale price maintenance agreements, are likely to
result in a diminuition of both intrabrand and interbrand competition, and
should be declared illegal per se, irrespective of the manufacturers or suppli-
ers desire to protect the trademark and protect against "free-riders." 1 1
Thirdly, a restraint ostensibly imposed by a manufacturer or supplier
should be condemned per se illegal where there is a substantial likelihood it
will contravene the goals or objectives of the antitrust laws. Where a partic-
ular restraint stifles, or is intended to stifle, individual dealer initiative or
innovation in local marketing, as, for example in Pitchford v. Pepi, Inc.1 92
and Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v. Sealy, Inc.,193 (where imagi-
native and aggressive marketing activities by distributors were persistently
dampened by reluctant suppliers), the restraint should be condemned. In
both instances, it is plain that the plaintiff distributors were more competi-
tive than other distributors, that the form of competition was fair and price-
reducing, and that the restraints, which were not exclusive, were intended to
dampen intrabrand competition by the plaintiffs.
A court should similarly strike down dual distribution arrangements in
which the supplier-distributor may arbitrarily limit the territory of a dis-
tributor or terminate a distributor either on behalf of a preferred distributor
or in order to take the territory itself. While a supplier should be permitted
some latitude to engage in fair contracts for the distribution of its products
188. 432 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1970).
189. 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975).
190. See Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, supra note 2, at 9-10. However, in United
States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), the Court rejected the argument, although it was
economically plausible, that the exclusive territorial restriction was necessary to permit the
members to effectively compete with the large chain supermarkets.
191. Compare California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Co., 100 S. Ct.
937, 947 (1980) (evidence that resale price maintenance has a substantial adverse effect on
small retail firms) and Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977)
(resale price maintenance reduces both interbrand and intrabrand competition) with The Su-
preme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. Rav. 70, 240 (1977).
192. 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1976).
193. 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979).
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and to terminate distributors for bona fide grievances or for good faith alter-
ations in marketing plans, suppliers should not be permitted to preclude the
development of certain territory by an effective and aggressive distributor,
such as in Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp.,"9 or to use restrictive provi-
sions in agreements to coerce distributors that are attempting to break into
a market, such as in Dougherty v. Continental Oil Co.1 9 5 Finally, manufac-
turers or suppliers should not be permitted to impose onerous agreements
which permit the supplier to substantially reduce the sales area of a distrib-
utor and thereafter increase its own sales area, such as in Pitchford v. Pepi,
Inc.' " There are, as some courts have recognized, certain basic rights of dis-
tributors or franchisees to obtain an interest in continued access to goods
and trademark use of the franchisor or supplier while the distributor is
faithfully performing its obligations under the agreement. A failure to recog-
nize these basic rights of distributors or franchisees to take individual re-
sponsibility for their commercial decision-making and marketing activities
and to continued access to goods will seriously impair the ability of small
businesses to continue performing distributional activities. Therefore, re-
strictive provisions in distribution or franchise agreements which permit sig-
nificant changes in the dealer or franchisee's rights for arbitrary or perni-
cious reasons should be declared per se illegal.
V. CONCLUSION
The rule of reason and the per se rule remain the judicial tools to im-
plement the objectives of the antitrust laws. While the Sylvania Court bal-
anced the goals of the Sherman Act to favor application of the rule of reason
to a clearly pro-competitive arrangement, this Article has demonstrated that
many antitrust goals dictate that the per se rule should apply to many other
intrabrand restrictions, such as manufacturer and dealer agreements to allo-
cate products or services, many restrictive provisions in agreements by firms
that supply goods to distributors and simultaneously act as distributors of
the same type of goods, and other unnecessarily intensive restrictions which
will have negligible procompetitive effects.
The cases and legislative activities discussed in the Article have served
to develop recurrent motives and devices which restrict intrabrand competi-
tion, and which "because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack
of any redeeming virtue," should be declared per se unlawful. However,
these cases also illustrate that because of their arguable benefits to inter-
brand competition and their ability to achieve certain non-economic goals to
the antitrust laws, some restrictive provisions should be examined in each
instance for their reasonableness. Only by a careful consideration of the pur-
194. 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969).
195. 579 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1978).
196. 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1976).
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pose and effects-economic and non-economic--of various non-price in-
trabrand restrictions can a court make principled decisions regarding the
desirability of any restraint and, thereby, provide meaningful guidance for
business decision-making.
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